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1 Introduction
A large body of evidence in psychology, economics, neuroscience, and consumer research indi-
cates that the satisfaction people derive from their experiences is influenced by their perception
of what would have occurred had they made different choices1: we experience regret when we
perceive that we would have been better off, and we rejoice when we perceive that we are better
off than we would have been. Crucially, these emotions are responses to our ex post evalua-
tion of our actions relative to unchosen alternatives. Even if our action was optimal given the
information available ex ante, we nevertheless experience regret when we later discover that
some other action would have made us better off. This irrational impulse appears, however,
to be coupled with considerable foresight. The evidence suggests that people anticipate these
emotions and that they are prepared to trade-off purely material considerations against their
desire to avoid future regret (and maximise future rejoicing).
In the light of this evidence, we study the impact of anticipated regret on decision making.
We consider an agent who cares directly about the relative performance of his chosen option
with respect to foregone alternatives, and who rationally takes these concerns into account
when he makes his decisions. This fundamental behavioural assumption is the centre piece of
the seminal regret theories of Loomes and Sugden (1982 and 1987a) and Bell (1982 and 1983),
which generate predictions that are consistent with many empirical violations of expected utility
theory, such as the Allais paradox.2
These theories are essentially static in nature: there is a single decision period, and regrets
are realised at the end of the period when the agent learns the state of the world and receives
his material payoff.This paper goes beyond these classic treatments and extends regret theory
to dynamic decision problems in which multiple decisions have to be taken at different points
in time.3
In the analysis of such dynamic situations, a number of conceptually novel issues arise that
are absent from a static context. This is because the relative performance of an early decision
cannot be fully assessed until the consequences of subsequent decisions that affect the eventual
payoff have become apparent. Therefore, the agent’s final regrets will only be determined at
the culmination of a sequence of actions. This means that later decisions are not only driven
by forward looking considerations; they are also influenced by backward looking considerations
1We review this evidence below.
2A number of studies have experimentally tested the predictions of the classic regret theories. We review
this literature below.
3The original formulation of regret theory might be an appropriate tool for analysing decision making in
some dynamic contexts. For instance, Irons and Hepburn (2003) use the original formulation of regret theory
to analyse a sequential search model.
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that arise from the agent’s desire to minimise his ultimate regrets from early choices. In other
words, in dynamic contexts the regret associated with an action taken in a particular period is
generally not “sunk” at the end of that period.
This implies that an agent’s regret concerns inevitably lead him to care about his behaviour
at counterfactual decision nodes, that is, decision nodes that he would have reached had he
acted differently in the past. Consider, for example, a career choice problem in which an
agent first chooses whether to study economics or philosophy and then chooses an occupation.
Suppose that the agent has chosen economics and is deciding on a career for himself. In doing
so, he needs to assess how his current career choice will influence his future regrets that will
arise from the comparison between the ultimate payoff consequences of his actual economics
degree and his forgone philosophy degree. Now notice that the ultimate payoff that is associated
with the decision to study philosophy depends upon the career path that the agent would have
subsequently chosen. Hence, the agent’s anticipated regret depends upon his conjectures about
this counterfactual career path. Moreover, since he cares about regret, these conjectures will
influence his optimal career choice as an economist.
We assume that the rationality of the agent imposes constraints on the conjectures he can
adopt about this alternative career path. That is, we suppose that he understands that had
he chosen philosophy, he would, in order to determine his occupational choice, conjecture in
a similar manner about his behaviour as an economist. Thus, we view the agent’s period
2 behaviour as the outcome of a game played between the possible selves (economist and
philosopher) that arise as a result of his period 1 choice. Our behavioural prediction is that his
period 2 behaviour will constitute an equilibrium of this game: a regret equilibrium.4
Beyond clarifying these conceptual issues, we aim to derive specific behavioural predictions
that arise from regret equilibrium. To do so, we require a plausible specification of the agent’s
preferences. Therefore, before we undertake the analysis of multi-period decision making, we
outline a representation of the agent’s preferences and demonstrate that, in a static context, it
replicates a number of empirical regularities that are suggested by the psychological evidence.
This representation of preferences has two key features. First, the agent cares about the
departure of chosen outcomes from a reference point, which is given by his best estimate of
what he could have gotten under another choice, given his current information. Second, he
dislikes losses relative to the reference point more than he likes equivalent gains. Thus, his fear
of regret is a more potent force than his love of rejoicing. This means that the agent is averse
4Formally, our game is a special case of a psychological game, and regret equilibrium is a psychological Nash
equilibrium (see Geanakoplos et al., 1989). In a psychological game, players care about their beliefs about what
other players do and believe. In our game, the agent cares about his beliefs about what his other possible selves
do.
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to evaluation risk : he dislikes uncertainty about the difference between his eventual payoff and
reference point.
The implications of this are threefold. First, the agent is averse to payoff uncertainty, holding
the reference point constant. Second, he dislikes variation in the reference point, holding the
payoff constant. Since new information about unchosen options puts the reference point at risk,
this means that he dislikes such information.5 Finally, he is better off when the outcome of his
chosen action is more positively correlated with the outcome of unchosen alternatives.
In a simple two period model, the agent’s regret concerns generate a rich set of behavioural
predictions. These results are driven by the fact that the agent may use his second period
action to strategically minimise the overall evaluation risk to which he is exposed.
In a setting in which the agent makes two similar decisions in successive periods, we identify
two opposing forces on his behaviour. On the one hand, his aversion to feedback on foregone
options leads him to behave conservatively. He exhibits a tendency to stick to his past choices,
even in the face of evidence that indicates that switching would be payoff maximising. This
tendency arises because by sticking to his first period choice he avoids learning what he could
have received had he taken a different course of action in the first place. On the other hand,
he also exhibits a reparative tendency, which manifests itself in a tendency to try to make
up for missed opportunities. He increases the correlation between his eventual payoff and
counterfactual payoff by choosing an action in the second period that is similar to the action
that he turned down in the first.
The balance of the two effects depends on how important the second decision is in payoff
terms. When it is unimportant, the second period choice has little effect on the extent to
which the agent’s total payoff matches his counterfactual payoff while its information content
is undimininished. This means that his feedback aversion prevails and he acts conservatively.
As the second period decision becomes more important in payoff terms, the matching potential
of the second period action increases and so he becomes more prone to switching to a different
course of action.
In a setting in which the payoff consequences of the first and second period decisions are
independent, the agent’s prevailing concern in the second period is to match the actions that
he believes his counterfactual selveswould have chosen in period 2. Suppose, for example, that
he has chosen to become a lawyer rather than a consultant and now must decide how hard he
will work at his chosen career. Then the belief that he would have worked hard had he become
a consultant drives him to work hard as a lawyer, since the pain of doing badly in material
terms as a lawyer is then compounded by its unfavourable comparison with the counterfactual
5This is in line with psychological evidence, which we review in Section 3.2.
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in which he became a successful consultant. Conversely, if he believes that he would have been
a lazy consultant he has less incentive to work hard as a lawyer. Thus, the agent’s motivation is
influenced by his self-conception, specifically, his beliefs about how he would behave in certain
counterfactual situations.
Thus, the agent in our model has counterfactual thought processes which extend beyond the
mere enumeration of unchosen options to the consideration of his own behaviour in alternative
possible worlds. We go beyond the original regret theories by providing a conceptual frame-
work within which an agent’s counterfactual beliefs and actual behaviour are simultaneously
determined as part of an equilibrium of an intrapersonal game.
Related Literature An alternative means of analysing regret concerns in a dynamic con-
text is proposed by Eyster (2002). Eyster derives behavioural implications of a “taste for
consistency” whereby agents have a preference for actions which cast past decisions in a more
favourable light. Specifically, agents like actions which warrant having taken a past action,
which means that agents’ current decisions tend to be influenced by sunk costs (or past op-
portunity costs). On a related note, Prendergast and Stole (1996) consider a signalling story
in which agents overreact to early private information and underreact to later information in
order to send a signal to their future selves (or some third party) about the quality of their
decisions. Finally, Yariv (2005) considers a model in which agents can actually choose their
beliefs directly in order to make themselves feel better about past decisions. Current actions
are then taken in the light of the resulting beliefs and so tend to reflect past judgements too
closely.
All three of these models share with ours the notion that an agent’s current decisions have
a backward looking component. However, these are models in which an agent, in one way or
another, explicitly seeks to rationalise past decisions.6 In our model, by contrast, the agent
has a more basic concern, which is simply to avoid information which threatens to cast a past
decision in a more unfavourable light. Thus, for instance, switching course of action might
reveal information about unchosen alternatives and hence put the reference point at risk. Our
agent does not engage in attempts to rationalise past decisions: neither does he have an intrinsic
taste for consistency (as in Eyster), nor limited recall that would enable him to influence his
future self’s beliefs through costly signalling (as in Prendergast and Stole), nor can he directly
choose his beliefs to minimise his regrets (as in Yariv).
From a methodological point of view, the work that is most relevant to the current approach
6In Eyster, current actions provide agents with a rationale for actions taken in the past; in Prendergast and
Stole, actions rationalise past actions indirectly, insofar as they influence the agent’s beliefs about the wisdom
of his past choices; finally, in Yariv’s model, agents directly manipulate their perception of their past decisions.
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is Koszegi’s (2004) development of the concept of “personal equilibrium”. Agents are assumed
to care directly about their beliefs about the actions they will choose in the continuation games
following their current action, and these beliefs are, in turn, required to correctly predict their
subsequent equilibrium behaviour.7 In contrast, in our setting, the agent cares directly about
the beliefs about the actions he would choose in the continuation games following counterfactual
actions. Hence, our notion of regret equilibrium may be viewed as an analogue to the notion
of a personal equilibrium in situations in which agents care directly about their beliefs about
their counterfactual behaviour.8
We conclude with a brief overview of the empirical evidence on regret that we alluded to
at the outset. First, there is a literature in experimental economics that tested a number of
predictions implied by the original regret theories by Loomes and Sugden (1982 and 1987a),
such as juxtaposition effects9 and violations of monotonicity and transitivity. Early experiments
found evidence for these effects and argued that they are best explained by regret theory.10
Subsequent studies, however, indicate that the results of these early experiments are sensitive
to subtle details in the format, in which decision problems are presented to subjects (see Harless,
1992, and Starmer and Sugden 1993, 1998). Thus, the experimental validity of regret theory,
as with most choice theories, does appear to be vulnerable to framing effects11: when decision
problems are presented in formats, in which regret considerations are made particularly salient,
patterns of choice that are uniquely predicted by regret theory do occur and are best explained
by regret theory but these effects seem to disappear when the presentation format makes regret
considerations less salient (see Starmer and Sugden, 1998).
While this experimental economics literature focusses exclusively on testing predictions
of regret theory when the outcomes of unchosen lotteries are always revealed to the agent,
7Personal equilibrium includes the notion of loss-aversion equilibrium (see Koszegi and Rabin, 2004, and
Heidhues and Koszegi, 2004). This captures “disappointment”, the emotional response to falling short of one’s
expectations.
8Also related to our approach are a number of papers that consider agents who, like the agents in our
paper, care directly about certain beliefs that they hold. For instance, Koszegi (2000a and 2000b) considers
implications of an agent’s concern with his self image and Caplin and Leahy (2001) consider preferences which
have an anticipatory component, reflecting the pleasure or pain an agent derives from his beliefs about his future
prospects.
9A juxtaposition effect occurs when preferences over lotteries depend on the joint distribution of the lotteries
in the choice set and not only on each lottery’s marginal distribution.
10See, for example, Loomes (1988a, 1988b), Loomes and Sugden (1987a, 1987b), Loomes et al. (1991, 1992),
Starmer and Sugden (1989).
11For example, Starmer and Sugden (1993) find that juxtaposition effects largely disappear when an experi-
mental design is used that controls for so-called event-splitting effects. These effects arise from the tendency of
subjects to put more weight on an event if it is presented as several sub-events than if it is presented as a single
event.
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Bell (1983, p.1165) suggested that the “hypothesis that it may matter whether a foregone
alternative is resolved or not ... is the predicted phenomenon on which experimentation should
be concentrated”. This proposal has inspired psychologists to conduct experiments to examine
the effect that varying the amount of feedback on unchosen alternatives has on subject’s choices.
Their findings support a version of regret theory, like the one we use here, in which an agent’s
regret concerns make him averse to such feedback.12
There is alsoa psychological literature which seeks to measure the impact of the counter-
factual emotions of regret and disappointment directly. In a series of experiments Mellers et
al. (1999) simultaneously measure emotions - both actual and anticipated - and choice. They
measure anticipated emotions by asking people to rate how they would feel about hypothetical
monetary outcomes of gambles chosen from a menu of two choices in both the presence and
absence of feedback on unchosen gambles. Likewise, actual emotions are measured by asking
people to assess their post-choice level of satisfaction when the outcomes are real. Overall,
they find support for their hypothesis that agents make choices to maximise their expected
anticipated pleasure, where the anticipated pleasure of an outcome depends on its monetary
payoff, the extent to which the monetary payoff falls short or exceeds its initially expected
payoff (disappointment) and the expected (or actually realised) payoff of the other gambles in
the set from which agents may choose (regret).13
In addition, there is a literature in consumer research which suggests both that regret
influences consumers’ post-choice valuations of their purchases (Inman et al., 1997 and Taylor,
1997) and that anticipation of regret influences purchase decisions (Simonson, 1992).
Finally, there is a literature in neuroscience which seeks to investigate the neurological basis
of emotions such as regret and disappointment. For example, using a similar experimental
setup to Mellers et al. (1999), Camille et al. (2004) find that, in contrast to normal subjects,
the emotional responses of patients with orbitofrontal cortical lesions are insensitive to the
nature of the feedback they receive on unchosen gambles, which suggests that they are unable
to experience regret. This suggests that the experience of regret is closely associated with a
particular region of the brain (the orbitofrontal cortex).14
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we outline the basic model
of preferences that captures the agent’s regret concerns. In Section 3, we derive the essential
properties of these preferences that drive the main results of the paper and consider some basic
implications for behaviour when there is just a single decision period. In Section 4, we extend
12We review this evidence in more detail in Section 3.2.
13See also Mellers (2000) and Mellers and McGraw (2001).
14Disappointment effects were mitigated somewhat, but were nevertheless present, suggesting that regret has
a different neurological basis from that of disappointment.
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the model to two decision periods and introduce the concept of regret equilibrium. In Section
5, we apply the equilibrium concept to the analysis of behaviour in two different scenarios: (1)
a setting in which the agent makes similar decisions in each of the two periods; and (2) a setting
in which payoffs from the second decision are independent of the payoffs from the first. Section
6 concludes. Throughout, we relate our findings to the psychological evidence. All proofs are
relegated to an appendix.
2 The static setup
In this section, we outline the basic model that we use to analyse decision making in a single
period. There is a single agent who chooses an action from a finite set Y . An action y ∈ Y
corresponds to a real-valued random variable, a lottery, Xy that is distributed with c.d.f Fy. A
typical realisation ofXy is denoted xy, and the set of all lotteries is denoted by L = {Xy|y ∈ Y }.
We assume that the lotteries in L have finite first moments. Further assumptions are mentioned
in passing.
The agent cares about two things. First, he cares about his material payoff. When the
agent chooses lottery Xy, then his instantaneous material payoff from realisation xy is given by
φ (xy), where φ is a real-valued, continuous, increasing and weakly concave function. Thus, φ
has the properties of a standard utility function in which marginal material utility is declining
in wealth.
Second, he cares about his evaluation of the performance of his action relative to the perfor-
mance of forgone alternatives in his choice set. When he perceives that his action has performed
relatively well, he rejoices and his utility improves. When he perceives that it has performed
relatively poorly, he regrets his decision and his utility falls.
The agent’s evaluation of an action’s relative performance is given by the deviation of its
material utility from a reference point, R, that represents the agent’s aggregate assessment of
the performance of other actions in Y . To capture this formally, we divide the timeline into a
decision period, t = 1, during which the agent chooses an action y, and an evaluation period,
t = T > 1. In the evaluation period, the agent receives his material payoff and evaluates the
relative performance of y given his information in t = T .
To simplify the exposition, we assume in this section that in period T the agent is either
fully informed about an option in Y or not informed about it at all.15 This means that the
agent’s period T information can be captured by a subset LT ⊆ L of lotteries whose realisations
are known to the agent in period T . More specifically, we assume that LT contains a set ∆LT
15We shall relax this assumption when we consider the dynamic context. All results for the single period
problem extend easily to the case where the agent’s information in T is generated by general signals.
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of lotteries whose realisations are revealed to the agent after he has chosen y in period 1 as well
as the outcome of the lottery chosen in t = 1. Hence, LT = ∆LT ∪ {Xy}. We shall write I (L0)
to denote the information set generated by the subset L0 ⊆ L and denote by IT = I (LT ) the
agent’s information in period T .16
The reference point against which the agent evaluates his decision to choose y is then given
by the agent’s estimate of the material utility he could have obtained from the best possible
unchosen alternative in his choice set given his final information. Thus,
Ry = max
y0∈Y \y
E [φ (Xy0) |IT ] .
Notice that Ry is a real-valued random variable whose realisation the agent learns in period T
at the latest.17 We denote a typical realisation of Ry by ry.18
In the evaluation period, given a reference point realisation ry, the agent evaluates the
difference φ (xy) − ry between his actual material utility and his reference point by a real-
valued, continuous, increasing, and strictly concave function ρ with ρ (0) = 0, whose domain
ranges over all possible values of φ (xy)− ry.19 That is, the agent’s overall instantaneous utility
from action y, which is realised in period T , is defined as
u (y) = φ (xy) + θρ (φ (xy)− ry) ,
where the parameter θ ≥ 0 measures the intensity of the agent’s regret concerns relative to his
material concerns. We call an agent with θ > 0 a regretful agent and an agent with θ = 0 a
standard agent.
ρ (0) = 0 reflects the fact that the agent likes a positive relative performance (he rejoices)
and dislikes a negative relative performance (he experiences regret). The concavity of ρ implies
loss aversion, that is the agent’s regret about a negative performance is stronger than his
rejoicing about an equivalently positive performance.20.
Three comments about this specification are in order. First, it should be clear that the
regretful agent evaluates his decision from an ex-post perspective in light of his final information.
16More precisely, IT is the σ-algebra or partition - defined on an appropriate state space - that is generated
by the lotteries in LT . The expectation conditional on IT is then the expectation conditional on knowing the
realisations of all lotteries in LT .
17Formally, Ry also depends on Y . Since we consider cases only in which Y is fixed, we suppress this
dependency.
18We have chosen the maximum specification mainly for ease of exposition. An alternative specification is a
weighted average over the expected values of the forgone options. All of our results carry over to this case.
19Strict concavity means that for all λ ∈ (0, 1) , x, x0: ρ (λx+ (1− λ)x0) > λρ (x) + (1− λ) ρ (x0).
20Loss aversion is, by now, a familiar and well-established empirical regularity (Rabin, 1998). In the context
of regret, e.g. Mellers et al. (1999), Camille et al. (2004), and Inman et al. (1997) find that regret looms larger
than rejoicing.
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This is the fundamental behavioural assumption of regret theory. The agent regrets a decision
with a poor outcome even though this decision might have been optimal at the point of decision
making. Indeed, if the agent evaluated the relative performance of his decision based upon the
information that was available to him at the point of decision making, then his behaviour would
be indistinguishable from that of a standard expected utility maximiser.
Second, our framework builds on Bell (1983) who, like us, allows for the possibility that
unchosen lotteries are only partially resolved. He looks at independent lotteries and provides
natural conditions under which the reference point is given by the expectation of the unchosen
lottery. In contrast, Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) implicitly assume that the
uncertainty with respect to forgone lotteries is fully resolved after the choice was made. In
this case, the reference point is determined by the realisation of the unchosen lotteries, and our
formulation reproduces the original formulations.
Third, concavity is a familiar assumption in economics, but less so in psychology. Indeed,
Mellers et al. (1999) suggest that the regret function is S-shaped, that is ρ is concave over
gains (rejoicing domain) but convex over losses (regret domain).21 We assume concavity of
ρ because it is an analytically elegant way to generate a behavioural regularity that features
prominently in a number of experiments on regret: people tend to make choices that minimise
their exposure to information on forgone alternatives.22
3 Decision making in the static setup
This section has two purposes. First, we outline basic properties of the regretful agent’s pref-
erences when there is a single decision period in order to develop intuitions that are helpful in
understanding the dynamic decision problems studied below. Second, we argue for the plausi-
bility of our specification of preferences by deriving behavioural predictions and showing that
they are in line with empirical evidence.
Throughout we assume that the agent correctly anticipates his emotional response at the
evaluation stage and maximises his expected utility taking his regret concerns into account. This
means that the agent chooses an action y ∈ Y so as to maximise his expected instantaneous
utility
U(y,∆LT ) ≡ E [u(y)] = E [φ (Xy)] + θE [ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry)] .
This specification of preferences has the crucial implication that the regretful agent is averse
to evaluation risk : the ex ante variability of the difference between the payoff of his chosen
21This is reminiscent of the S-shaped value function of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory.
22Section 3.2 will make these points explicit.
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action and his reference payoff. This is the key property of the agent’s preferences that we shall
explore in this paper. Evaluation risk aversion is a direct consequence of the concavity of the
regret function ρ. The following Lemma is immediate (and thus stated without proof).
Lemma 1 Let y, y0 ∈ Y and let Ry and Ry0 be the corresponding reference points. Suppose
E [φ (Xy)] = E [φ (Xy0)] and E [Ry] = E [Ry0 ], and let φ (Xy) − Ry second order stochastically
dominate φ (Xy0)−Ry0. Then the agent prefers y to y0.
Evaluation risk aversion implies that the agent is averse both to ex ante variation in his payoff
holding his reference point constant, and to variation in his reference point holding his payoff
constant. We refer to the former effect as payoff risk aversion and the latter effect as reference
point risk aversion. In addition, it implies that the agent likes the lotteries in his choice set to
be positively correlated. We refer to this effect as the correlation effect.
In the following subsections, we formally characterise these effects and consider what they
imply about a regretful agent’s overall risk attitudes.
3.1 Payoff risk aversion
In the absence of feedback on foregone options, the agent behaves like an ordinary risk-averter.
This is summarised formally by the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that (Xy)y∈Y are stochastically independent. Suppose there is no exogenous
feedback, i.e. ∆LT = ∅. Fix two actions, y, y0 ∈ Y , with E [φ (Xy)] = E[φ (Xy0)]. Let Xy
second order stochastically dominate Xy0. Then the agent prefers y to y0. This is true even if
φ is linear.
Lemma 2 is a straightforward consequence of the concavity of ρ and φ. It is consistent with
psychological evidence which suggests that anticipated regret may be associated with more risk
averse decision making.23
From a methodological point of view, Lemma 2 highlights the importance of distinguishing
clearly between behaviour that is motivated by regret and behaviour that is motivated by
standard considerations of diminishing marginal utility. Therefore, we must isolate behavioural
23Zeelenberg (1996) reports that “implicit or explicit in most experimental work on anticipated regret is the
idea that it leads to risk aversion” (p. 149). According to Kardes (1994), “concern about regret that may follow
a bad decision promotes extreme risk aversion” (p. 448). In a consumer research context, Simonson (1992)
finds that experimental subjects make more risk averse choices (paying a higher price for a better known brand)
when asked to anticipate regret and responsibility. Finally, Josephs et al. (1992) provide experimental evidence
that low self-esteem subjects who, they argue, may be more predisposed to experience regret tend to make more
risk averse choices than high self-esteem agents, who may be less predisposed to such feelings.
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predictions that arise in our framework that could not be generated by expected utility theory
alone. Hence, we take the behaviour of the standard agent as the benchmark against which we
contrast the regretful agent’s behaviour.
3.2 Reference point risk aversion
Evaluation risk aversion also implies reference point risk aversion. The following Lemma char-
acterises what we mean by this.
Lemma 3 Fix an action y ∈ Y and consider two final information sets IT and I 0T . Suppose
that I 0T is more informative than IT . Then the agent prefers final information set IT to final
information set I 0T .
Intuitively, the agent dislikes uncertainty about his future reference point for any given action
he has chosen because such uncertainty increases the fluctuations in the relative performance
of his chosen action. Since reference point uncertainty arises only when the agent receives
information about unchosen options after he has made his choice, it follows that the agent is
averse to receiving such information. In this sense, reference point risk aversion corresponds to
ex post information aversion.
One of the central findings of psychological research is that regret concerns induce risk pref-
erences that depend upon the feedback on unchosen options that people expect to receive.24
The following example illustrates that reference point risk aversion generates this feature.
Example 1 Let Y ∈ {a, b}. Suppose that φ (x) = x and that Xa and Xb are both sym-
metrically distributed with E [Xa] = E [Xb]. Suppose that the agent learns the realisation of
Xa regardless of his choice while he learns the realisation of Xb only if he chooses b. Then the
agent (weakly) prefers a to b.
Example 1 says that, all else equal, the agent chooses actions that minimise his exposure
to ex-post information. This is straightforward consequence of reference point risk aversion: by
choosing a, the agent’s reference point is safe whereas by choosing b, he faces ex ante uncer-
tainty about his reference point. Notice that the result holds irrespective of the risk associated
with each option. Even if Xb second order stochastically dominates Xa, the regretful agent
chooses a. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 2 that the agent would choose the less risky option
24On this point, see also Bell (1983) who considers the choice between a risky gamble and a sure thing and
hypothesises that the sure thing becomes more attractive if the uncertainty about the risky gamble is not
resolved (p. 1160).
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if no feedback was provided on unchosen options, and it is easy to see that the same is true if
he always receives feedback on all options.
The relation between risk preferences and feedback has been tested experimentally in a
number of psychological studies. In support of our model, most experimental studies find
that subjects’ behaviour is influenced by the amount of feedback they expect to obtain on
unchosen options.25 Larrick and Boles (1994), in a negotiation experiment, and Ritov (1996),
in a gambling experiment, find that subjects become more willing to take risks if feedback on
the risky alternative is provided. Similar findings are reported by Zeelenberg et al. (1996) in a
gambling task, and by Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) in an ultimatum game experiment.26 For
a more detailed review of the experimental evidence see Zeelenberg (1999).
In a field study, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) find that anticipated regret is a predictor
of participation among players of the Dutch Postcode Lottery, but not among players of the
State Lottery. The difference is attributed to the fact that winners of the Postcode Lottery
are determined by postcode, and thus, potential participants learn whether or not they would
have won regardless of whether they choose to play from their neighbours, while such forced
feedback about the outcome is not a feature of the State Lottery.
3.3 A correlation effect
In the previous subsections, we derived implications of evaluation risk aversion in situations
in which either the agent’s payoff or his reference point was held constant. We now look at
situations in which payoff and reference point are interdependent. This is the case when lotteries
are correlated. In order to provide a parsimonious means of varying the degree of correlation
between lotteries, we compare a simple lottery with a compound lottery. More precisely, for
two lotteries X and bX, and for β ∈ [0, 1] we denote by β ◦ X ⊕ (1− β) ◦ bX the compound
lottery that yields lottery X with probability β and lottery bX with probability (1− β). When
β = 1, the compound lottery is perfectly positively correlated with X, and when β = 0, the
compound lottery is perfectly correlated with bX.
As the following Lemma makes clear, the agent’s regret concerns cause him to like the
lotteries in his choice set to be positively correlated. We refer to this effect as the correlation
effect.
Lemma 4 Let Xa and bXa be i.i.d.27. Fix β ∈ [0, 1], and define Xβ = β ◦Xa⊕ (1− β) ◦³ bXa´.
25An exception is Kelsey and Schepanski (1991) who, in the context of a taxpayer reporting decision experi-
ment, find no evidence that the feedback that subjects expect to obtain has an impact on behaviour.
26In a gambling experiment, Josephs et al (1992) induce risk averse choices of low self-esteem subjects by
providing feedback on forgone options, but in their setup, the risk averse choice minimises regret.
27 identically and independently distributed.
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Let Y = {a,β} and suppose the agent chooses a. Then the agent’s utility increases in β. This
is true regardless of whether or not the outcome of Xβ is revealed.
The intuition for Lemma 4 is straightforward. Evaluation risk aversion means that the agent
is averse to ex ante fluctuations in the relative performance of his chosen action. Positive
correlation between his actual payoff and his reference payoff reduces these fluctuations. In the
extreme case of perfect positive correlation, any variation between an action’s payoff and its
reference payoff is eliminated, and the agent is perfectly insured against any regrets.28
4 Dynamic decision making and regret equilibrium
We now turn to the analysis of dynamic decision problems in which the ultimate payoff the
agent receives is the consequence of multiple decisions. In analysing such decision problems, two
key issues arise. First, an agent’s subsequent decision may influence the regret he experiences
about early actions. Second, his conjectures about his behaviour at counterfactual decision
nodes play a crucial role in determining his eventual regrets, and, hence, his actions.
Figure 1: Two decision trees
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To illustrate the first issue, consider the following decision problem that may be represented by
decision tree I in Figure 1. In period 1, the agent has to invest money in either a risky project
(R) or a safe opportunity (S). In period 1.5, if he has chosen the risky project, he obtains
a signal indicating whether the project is likely to pay off or not, and in period 2 he has to
decide whether to continue the project (c) or to abandon it (a). If he continues the project, he
28It is straightforward to establish an analogous result, which shows that the agent’s utility is decreasing in
the degree of negative correlation between two lotteries in his choice set.
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obtains the return from the risky project (which might be either better or worse than the safe
opportunity). If he abandons it, he loses his initial investment (but avoids losses if the project
does not pay off). All payoffs are realised in period 3.
Suppose that the agent has chosenR, received an unfavourable signal about the risky project
and now has to decide between c and a. On the one hand, given his current information, R
appears to have been the wrong initial choice and thus the agent might already regret having
chosen R. On the other hand, the comparison between R and S only becomes fully evident in
period 3 when the ultimate payoffs are realised. Indeed, if he continues the project, it might
pay off with some likelihood in which case the agent will rejoice in R rather than regret it.
Therefore, the regrets associated with R should arise–at least partially–in period 3.
This simple observation has an important implication: in period 2, the regrets that the
agent expects to experience in period 3 as a result of choosing R will depend on whether the
agent chooses c or a in period 2. If he abandons the project, he will definitely regret having
chosen R rather than S. If he chooses to continue, however, he will rejoice in R with some
likelihood.
Now, consider a slight modification of the previous example. Suppose that the return from
S is also risky and, moreover, correlated with the return from R. Suppose also that, when the
project is abandoned after choice of R, no further information about R or S is revealed. In
this case, the decision between c and a affects not only the payoff from R but also the reference
point against which R is evaluated. If c is chosen, information about S will be revealed (due
to correlation between R and S) and the agent will update his reference point, while if a is
chosen, this will not be the case.
In general, when the agent decides between c and a in period 2, the eventual regrets from his
R decision are not “sunk” because they can still be affected by his second period decision. In
other words, the second period decision will have a backward looking component that arises from
the agent’s desire to minimise his ultimate regrets from his first period choice. To capture this,
we shall assume that regrets about a particular decision are realised at an ultimate evaluation
stage, after which no further events which may affect the apparent ex post wisdom of the
decision will occur. Making this assumption is the natural way to extend classic regret theory
to dynamic decision problems: as we previously noted, classic regret theory is built around the
assumption that agents evaluate their past decisions in the light of any information that they
have at their disposal once the payoffs from their choices and any available information about
unchosen alternatives has been realised.
To illustrate the role that the agent’s counterfactual conjectures will play, consider the set
of decision problems that may be represented by tree II. Such decision problems have the new
feature that the final payoff of both initial choices depends upon a continuation action. Suppose
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that the agent has already chosen A and is contemplating his second period decision. In doing
so, he needs to determine how his second period decision affects the extent to which he will
regret the initial choice of A in period 3. The extent to which he will regret this choice will
depend upon what he perceives that he would have gotten had he chosen B instead of A. This
depends on the continuation action that the agent believes he would have chosen after B. So
the agent’s regrets about having chosen A will depend upon his conjecture about what he would
have done in the counterfactual situation that would have arisen had he chosen B in the first
period. And given such a conjecture, the performance of A relative to that of B will depend
upon whether he choooses aA or bA.
Thus, to complete the specification of dynamic decision problems with regret, we need to
specify how the agent forms his conjectures about his behaviour at counterfactual decision
nodes. In the next section, we develop a framework that resolves this problem in the spirit
of rational expectations. For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to two-stage problems. The
extension to an arbitrary finite number of stages is conceptually similar.
4.1 The dynamic setup
We extend the timeline to two decision periods, t = 1, 2, and one evaluation period t = T > 2.
In period 1, the agent chooses an action y1 ∈ Y1. After having chosen y1 in period 1, the agent
is exogenously informed about the realisation z1 of a random variable (signal) Z1 (y1). Denote
by I2 = I (Z1 (y1)) the agent’s information set when he makes his period 2 choice.29
In period 2, contingent on having chosen y1 in period 1 and on signal realisation z1, the
agent chooses action y2 ∈ Y2 (y1). The set of feasible actions is denoted by
Y = {(y1, y2) |y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2 (y1)}, and each action y ∈ Y has an associated lottery Xy.
The set of all lotteries is denoted by L = {Xy|y ∈ Y }. After having chosen y2 the agent is
exogenously informed about the realisation z2 of a signal Z2 (y1, y2). In the evaluation period,
the agent receives his material payoff and evaluates his decision based on the information
available in t = T , which is given by IT = I
¡
Z1 (y1) , Z2 (y1, y2) ,X(y1,y2)
¢
.30
This specification contains the simplifying assumption that all regrets are realised in the
evaluation period and rules out the existence of interim regrets that might be experienced at
stage 2. As we argued above, the important point of the dynamic setup is that some regrets from
the period 1 decision are realised in an ultimate evaluation period. Our assumption focusses
our attention exclusively on the effect that these ultimate regret concerns have on the agent’s
29As before, we write I (Z) to denote the information set generated by the signal Z.
30The specification of IT assumes that the agent has perfect memory and is informed about the outcome of
his choice in the final period.
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decision making.
4.2 Preferences
When an agent makes decisions in two different periods, he might regret (or rejoice in) each
decision. Thus, for example, an agent may regret his initial choice of degree while also rejoicing
in his subsequent career choice, believing that his chosen career was the best option available
to him given his (albeit imperfect) choice of degree. To capture this, we disentangle the agent’s
overall regret from action (y1, y2) into two components, one corresponding to each decision.
Accordingly, his final payoff is evaluated with respect to two different reference points, R1 and
R2.
In period T , when the agent evaluates his second decision, y2, he takes his period 1 action,
y1, as given. That is, he compares the performance of y2 with the performance of the alternative
actions y02 ∈ Y2 (y1) that were available to him at the period 2 decision node induced by action
y1. Hence, his second period reference point, R2, is determined in exactly the same way as it
would have been had he simply been required to choose from the same choice set, Y2 (y1), in a
single period context. That is, the instantaneous regret that the agent experiences about his
second decision y2 in the evaluation period is given by
v2 (y1, y2) = ρ
µ
φ
¡
x(y1,y2)
¢
− max
y02∈Y2(y1)\y2
E
h
φ
³
X(y1,y02)
´¯¯¯
IT
i¶
As we noted previously, the key feature of the dynamic setup is that the outcome of a forgone
action y01 6= y1 depends on which period 2 action the agent would choose in the counterfactual
scenario that arises in the event that he has chosen y01 in period 1. Thus, to compare the
performance of his actual choice y1 to that of a counterfactual choice y01, the agent needs to
form a conjecture about his counterfactual continuation action at the decision node induced by
y01. We identify action y
0
1 with a counterfactual self S (y
0
1): the incarnation of the agent that
would have controlled the period 2 action in the event that y01 had been chosen in period 1.
Given that the agent chose y1, the agent’s conjecture is expressed by a belief, µ
(y01,z1)
2 ,
that specifies for each counterfactual self, S (y01) , y
0
1 6= y1, and all possible realisations z1 of
Z1 (y
0
1) a probability distribution over Y2 (y1). That is, the agent conjectures that in the event
that counterfactual self S (y01) observes signal z1 = z1 (y
0
1), it chooses action y2 ∈ Y2 (y01) with
probability µ
(y01,z1)
2 (y2). We denote the profile of all (contingent) beliefs about counterfactual
strategies by µ−y12 =
³
µ
y01
2
´
y01∈Y1\y1
.
The relative performance of action y1 with respect to a forgone alternative y01 is determined as
follows. The agent first computes the conditional probability that the counterfactual self S (y01)
is of type z1 conditional on his ex-post information IT . Using this he derives the probability
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µ
(y01,z1)
2 (y2) with which S (y
0
1) has chosen action y2 and then he uses these probabilities to
average over the expected values of φ
³
X(y01,y2)
´
conditional on IT .
The agent’s first period reference point, R1, is then given by the performance of the best
possible unchosen alternative in his first period choice set. Formally, given a conjecture µ−y12
and given actions (y1, y2), the instantaneous regret that the agent experiences about his first
decision y1 in the evaluation period is given by
v1
¡
y1, y2;µ
−y1
2
¢
= ρ
µ
φ
¡
x(y1,y2)
¢
− max
y01∈Y1\y1
Ez1(y01)
h
Ey2
h
φ
³
X(y01,y2)
´¯¯¯
IT
i¯¯¯
IT
i¶
,
where the first expectation is taken with respect to the conditional distribution of the signal
Z1 (y
0
1) conditional on IT , and the second expectation is taken with respect to the agent’s
conjecture µ
(y01,z1(y01))
2 and the conditional distribution of φ
³
X(y01,y2)
´
conditional on IT .
Finally, we make the assumption that the total regret that the agent experiences is a
weighted sum of his regret about his first and second decision. That is, the total instanta-
neous regret that the agent experiences in the evaluation period as a result of actions (y1, y2)
is given as
v
¡
y1, y2;µ
−y1
2
¢
= θ1v1
¡
y1, y2;µ
−y1
2
¢
+ θ2v2 (y1, y2) ,
where the parameters θt ≥ 0 measure the extent to which the agent cares about his first and
second period decision in regret terms.
Notice that our formulation embodies the psychological assumption that if the agent believes
that his counterfactual self chooses his second period action randomly, either because it plays a
mixed strategy, or because it makes its choices contingent on the realisation of a private signal,
he incoporates this uncertainty directly into the reference point. Since the agent is averse
to information about the reference point, he prefers not to receive information about what
exactly the counterfactual self ends up choosing. For instance, he dislikes information about the
realisation of the private signal that the counterfactual self has received if the counterfactual
self plays a contingent strategy. This assumption is in line with our assumptions about the
agent’s informational preferences in the static setup.
4.3 Behaviour
We now describe the assumptions that we make about the agent’s behaviour. We argue that
in this dynamic setup the agent’s behaviour is naturally described as the outcome of a non-
cooperative game played between the possible incarnations of the agent (actual and counter-
factual) that arise at each of his period 2 decision nodes.31
31Throughout we assume that the agent cannot commit to a period 2 action contingent on his first period
choice. If this was the case, we would be back in the static case: the agent would simply select a contingent
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Consider first the agent’s period 2 behaviour and suppose that his period 1 choice was y1.
We make two assumptions. First, we assume that, given a conjecture µ−y12 , the agent maximises
his expected utility taking into account his regret concerns. That is, he chooses y2 ∈ Y2 (y1) so
as to maximise
Uy1
¡
y2;µ
−y1
2
¢
≡ E
£
φ
¡
X(y1,y2)
¢
+ v
¡
y1, y2;µ
−y1
2
¢ |I2¤ .
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the agent is bound to his conjecture over
time. That is, in the evaluation period, the agent’s conjecture about his counterfactual self’s
strategy is the same as his period 2 conjecture.
Second, we assume that in forming his conjectures he rationally understands that had he
chosen y01, he would, in order to determine his behaviour in this counterfactual situation, reason
in a similar way about his current behaviour. This suggests that the agent’s period 2 behaviour
is the outcome of an intra-personal game G played between the agent’s counterfactual selves
where counterfactual self CS (y1)’s objective function is given by Uy1.
Because each self cares directly about his conjectures about his counterfactual selves’ actions,
the game G is formally recognisable as a psychological game (see Geanakoplos et al., 1989) and
we are naturally led to assume that the agent’s period 2 behaviour constitutes a psychological
Nash equilibrium. More precisely, let sy12 ∈ Y2 (y1) be a strategy for self S (y1), and denote by
s2 = (s
y1
2 )y1∈Y1 a strategy profile and by µ2 = (µ
y1
2 )y1∈Y1 a profile of conjectures. We define a
regret equilibrium as a psychological Nash equilibrium of G.
Definition 1 A pair (µ2, s2) is a (period 2) regret equilibrium if
(i) µ2 = s2
(ii) for each y1 ∈ Y1 and s02 ∈ Y2 (y1): Uy1
¡
s2;µ
−y1
2
¢
≥ Uy1
¡
s02;µ
−y1
2
¢
.
The set of all strategies s∗2 such that there is a (period 2) regret equilibrium (s
∗
2, s
∗
2) is denoted
by S∗2 .
Our key behavioural assumption is that the agent’s period 2 behaviour constitutes a (period 2)
regret equilibrium. Thus, we assume that each self plays a best response to his conjecture about
the other self’s behaviour and these conjectures correctly predict the other selves’ behaviour.32
Note that (i) implies that an equilibrium is fully specified by s2 alone. Thus, henceforth we
ommit any explicit mention of µ2.
strategy in period 1 and compare it to other contingent strategies that he could have chosen in period 1. In the
absence of a commitment device, we think this is a natural assumption.
32Since the two selves operate in different possible worlds, the actions of one do not affect the other’s payoffs
directly. One self’s actions affect the other only because they are correctly anticipated in equilibrium and each
self cares directly about their beliefs about the other self’s behaviour.
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Next consider period 1 behaviour. We assume that in period 1 the agent anticipates that
he will play a regret-equilibrium in period 2 and chooses action y1 so as to maximise
U (y1) ≡ E
h
φ
³
X(y1,sy12 )
´
+ v
¡
y1, s
y1
2 ; s
−y1
2
¢i
s.t. s2 ∈ S∗2 .
We call the agent’s overall behaviour (y1, s2) with an optimal period 1 action y1 and s2 ∈ S∗2 a
regret equilibrium.
The assumption that the agent’s behaviour constitutes a regret equilibrium is, in effect,
an assumption about the thought process via which the agent constructs the counterfactuals
against which he compares actual outcomes. The equilibrium concept embodies the assumption
that the agent cannot choose his conjectures freely, but must form them rationally based on
his understanding of the nature of the choices that his alternative possible selves must make.
That is, he views his counterfactual selves as fully rational agents who, just like himself, are
motivated by comparisons of their own actions with those of similarly rational counterfactual
selves. In short, he forms his conjectures in a sophisticated manner.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that the agent naively supposes that his counterfactual
selves simply choose whichever action maximises their expected material utility. More radically,
we could have assumed that the agent chooses his beliefs in a self-serving manner so as to
minimise his regrets.33 We do not consider the effects of such alternative assumptions here, since
we want to focus on behavioural implications of anticipated regret alone. Keeping assumptions
about the rationality of the agent in tact isolates the effects of this single departure from the
standard model. Also, the assumption of sophistication here seems to be the natural extension
of the notion of rational expectations to a setting in which the agent cares directly about his
beliefs about counterfactual outcomes.34
33Given that the agent’s conjectures are the outcome of a purely mental process about events which never, in
fact, happen, it is natural to wonder whether the agent might engage in a kind of “wishful thinking” and choose
his beliefs about his counterfactual selves in order to make himself feel good about his actual choices. Such an
agent’s beliefs would be irrational in a truth-seeking sense, but not necessarily irrational from the point of view
of maximising the agent’s overall utility.
34One could plausibly argue that the appropriate extension of rational expectations would restrict agents
conjectures about their opponents to rationalisable strategies rather than equilibrium strategies. In particular,
in the current context a player can never observe his opponents’ actions ex-post and thus a justification of
equilibrium play by a learning argument fails. In this sense, our equilibrium notion is too strong. However,
such an objection can also be levelled more generally against ordinary economic models in which rational agents
are assumed to anticipate equilibrium play (on this point, see Bernheim, 1982, pp. 1008-1010). Moreover, as
Koszegi (2004) argues, the common knowledge requirements necessary for equilibrium play might be more easily
satisfied in an intra-personal game when different selves of the same individual interact than in an ordinary
game (p. 8).
20
5 Implications of regret equilibrium
We now derive behavioural implications of our regret equilibrium concept. Notice that the
strategic interaction between the agent’s possible selves arises through the agent’s regret con-
cerns with respect to his period 1 choices. We therefore set θ2 = 0 from now on in order to isolate
these strategic effects. For θ2 > 0, all our results go through so long as period 1 regret concerns
are sufficiently large relative to period 2 regret concerns. Also, we are mainly interested in the
agent’s behaviour at stage 2. We do not explicitly look at his–rather straightforward–first
period behaviour.
We consider two kinds of situation. First, we consider repeated actions whose payoffs are
correlated across time. Second, we look at situations in which the payoffs of period 2 actions
are correlated across all possible decision nodes.
5.1 Correlation across time
Suppose the agent can choose repeatedly from actions with correlated payoffs. We identify two
opposing forces that drive the agent’s incentives in period 2. On the one hand, the agent’s
aversion to information on forgone lotteries will drive him to stick to past actions, that is, to
behave in an excessively conservative manner. On the other hand, his desire to correlate his
actual outcome with his counterfactual reference outcome will drive him to try to make up for
opportunities that he turned down in early periods by switching his course of action, a tendency
that might psychologically be interpreted as a reparative tendency.
In the next two subsections, we identify conditions under which each effect is likely to occur
and summarise the relevant evidence. We consider the following setup.35 In each of two periods,
t = 1, 2, the agent has to make a binary choice yt ∈ Yt = {a, b}. The payoffs of an action are
perfectly correlated across time. That is, action a yields lottery Xa in period 1 and lottery
λXa in period 2 for λ ≥ 0. Likewise, action b yields lottery Xb in period 1 and lottery λXb in
period 2. Lotteries Xa and Xb are stochastically independent. After the first period, the agent
receives a signal Z = (Za, Zb) that is informative about Xa and Xb.
The parameter λ reflects the weight on the second period payoff relative to the first period
payoff. When analysing the agent’s behaviour, we will be interested in the effects of varying λ.
5.1.1 Excess conservatism
We now consider how a regretful agent responds to news that questions the wisdom of his first
period choice. We assume that once the agent has made his second period choice, he only learns
35The setup can be easily generalised without changing our main results.
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the payoffs of the actions that he has chosen, but receives no additional information about the
other action’s payoffs. Hence, the agent’s terminal information set is IT = I (Z,Xy1, Xy2). This
assumption is crucial, because it enables the agent to manipulate the amount of information
he ultimately receives as a result of his second period decision.
More specifically, we assume that Xa and Xb have zero mean and compact support. We
consider signals that reveal whether an action’s payoff is positive or negative. Define the signal
Zy1 as
Zy1 =
(
+1 if Xy1 ≥ 0
−1 if Xy1 < 0.
After receiving the signal, the agent updates his beliefs about an action’s payoff. Conditional
on observing signal realisation zy1 the agent’s posterior about Xy1 is the resulting truncated
distribution. We assume that this conditional distribution is non-degenerate for all signal
realisations (za, zb).36 That is, the signal is not perfectly revealing.
Suppose the agent has chosen a in period 1 and received signal realisation (za, zb). Then
we shall say that news is “bad” if za < zb. If he has chosen b in period 1, a similar definition
applies.
The agent’s second period behaviour is described by a strategy sy1 = sy1 (za, zb) that pre-
scribes an action in Y2 contingent on all signal realisations. We are interested in how the agent
reacts to news. We shall say that the agent’s behaviour is conservative if he does not change
his action in response to “bad” news, i.e. if sa (−1,+1) = a and sb (+1,−1) = b.
Before we start the analysis of the agent’s second period behaviour, we briefly consider the
benchmark case of a standard agent.
Lemma 5 The period 2 behaviour of a standard agent is never conservative.
The Lemma holds more generally for signals that alter the agent’s interim beliefs about the
two options. In general, a standard agent seeks a compromise between increasing his expected
payoff and lowering the aggregate risk to which he is exposed. Intuitively, switching to a
different action in the second period reduces the aggregate risk, because it diversifies the agent’s
portfolio. Hence, the agent sticks to his first period choice only if it has an advantage in terms
of expected return. But this can never be the case if he receives bad news.
We now characterise the regretful agent’s second period behaviour and identify conditions
such that it exhibits conservatism.
Proposition 1 There exist strictly positive λ and θ1 such that for all λ ≤ λ and θ1 ≥ θ1 there
is a regret-equilibrium in which the agent’s period 2 behaviour is conservative.
36This is the case if Xa and Xb each contain more than one positive and more than one negative point in
their support.
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The key point of Proposition 1 is that in period 2 the regretful agent may stick to his first
period choice even though he receives unfavourable news and switching his action would both
raise his material payoff and reduce the aggregate payoff risk to which he is exposed. In this
sense, the agent acts as if he ignores evidence against his previous choice and exhibits excess
conservatism.
To understand what drives this result, notice that for a very small period 2 payoff weight,
λ, the period 2 decision has negligible payoff consequences while its information content is
undiminished. Thus, because the signal Z is not perfectly informative, it amounts to rejecting
or accepting ex-post information about the alternative forgone in period 1. Switching course
of action reveals what the agent would have obtained had he acted differently in period 1
and exposes the agent to reference point risk whereas staying with his first period choice adds
nothing to his final information set and so eliminates all reference point risk.
This conservative tendency provides an explanation for brand loyalty: by continuing to
consume a particular brand, consumers avoid the risk of learning that they would have been
better off had they consumed a different brand. In effect, the fear of regret generates a psycho-
logical switching cost. At a general level, as Camerer and Weber (1999) demonstrate, there is
evidence that people and organisations sometimes exhibit a tendency to maintain or increase
a commitment to a project even when the cost-benefit calculus suggests that they would be
wise to abandon it. Our theory suggests one factor which could contribute to such escalation
phenomena.
In fact, Tykocinski and Pittman (1998) offer some experimental confirmation of the idea
that people tend to stick to an original course of action in order to avoid facing the fact
that they ought to have chosen a different course of action in the first place. Specifically,
the results of their experiments suggest that when an individual initially forgoes an attractive
action opportunity, he will tend to decline a similar but substantially less attractive current
opportunity, even though it still has positive value.
Moreover, they argue that such behaviour is driven by a fear of regret.37 These experiments
do not, however, exactly replicate the features of our setup since subjects perfectly learn the
value of the option initially forgone before making their subsequent choice. However, in explain-
ing their results, Tycocinski and Pittman implicitly assume that agents are able to forget such
information about unchosen options that they may have once known unless they are explicitly
reminded of it. Thus, agents stick to an original course of action in order to avoid reminding
themselves of the value of the forgone alternative. We assume, by contrast, that agents have
37“Declining the subsequent action opportunity may appear to be illogical because this opportunity is still
attractive in an absolute sense, but it may also be psychologically rewarding because it mitigates the unpleasant
experience of regret produced by dwelling on a perceived loss” (p. 608).
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perfect memory but that they remain imperfectly imformed about an option in the event that
they did not choose it. Thus, agents stick to an original course of action in order to avoid
learning about a forgone option.
Interestingly, Tycocinski and Pittman also find that this tendency to avoid the foregone
course of action is attenuated when the agent will be reminded of it even if he does not sub-
sequently choose it. Similarly, in our setup, if we make the alternative assumption that the
regretful agent will receive full feedback on his available actions, irrespective of the choices that
he makes, then he no longer displays conservatism.
5.1.2 Reparative action
The previous result rests critically on the assumption that the second decision’s payoff conse-
quences are rather unimportant. In this case, the regretful agent’s desire to avoid information
about foregone alternatives drives him to stick to his first period action in the second period.
In this subsection, we identify a countervailing force on his behaviour, which drives him to try
to make up for missed opportunities by choosing a second period action that is similar to the
action he turned down in the first period. This force predominates when the two decisions are
of equal importance in payoff terms.
In contrast to the previous section we now assume, for simplicity, that the agent does not
get any feedback after period 1. The behavioural tendencies we identify will, however, also be
generated by a more complex model in which the agent does receive such interim feedback.
It turns out that the relative riskiness of the options a and b is a critical determinant of
the agent’s incentives. Thus, in order to characterise the forces at work, we shall want to
vary the degree of risk of a relative to b. A convenient way to do so, is to assume that Xa is
symmetrically distributed with mean E [Xa], and that Xb is given by the random variable γ bXa,
where bXa and Xa are i.i.d. The parameter γ reflects the relative riskiness of a and b. If γ ≥ 1,
then Xb second order stochastically dominates Xa, and the reverse if γ < 1.
In addition, our point becomes most transparent if λ = 1. So, for the rest of this section,
we focus exclusively on this case. We also assume that φ is strictly concave.38
Our aim is to identify conditions under which the behaviour of the regretful agent departs
from that of the standard agent. We thus first characterise the standard agent’s behaviour in
the current setup.
Lemma 6 Consider the standard agent. There are γ, γ with γ < 1 < γ such that the agent’s
38The case with linear φ is a boundary case, which is qualitatively similar, but requires slight changes in the
proofs. To save space, we ommit the argument.
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choice is given by
(y1, y2) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(b, b) if γ < γ
(a, b) or (b, a) if γ ∈
£
γ, γ
¢
(a, a) if γ ≥ γ.
The lemma says that the standard agent switches course of action if and only if the lotteries
are similarly risky, that is, if γ ∈
£
γ, γ
¢
. (Due to the symmetry of our setup, he is indifferent
between (a, b) and (b, a)). In this case, by switching course of action the agent diversifies the
aggregate payoff risk to which he is exposed. As the relative riskiness of one lottery becomes
extreme (γ < γ or γ ≥ γ), then choosing the less risky lottery in both periods minimises the
agent’s overall payoff risk.
We now turn to the regretful agent. The following lemma describes the best responses given
the counterfactual self switches action in period 2.
Lemma 7 Consider the regretful agent’s actual period 2 decision.
(i) Suppose the agent chose a in period 1 and the counterfactual self switches action in period
2. Then there is bbγ with bbγ > γ such that the agent switches course if and only if γ < bbγ.
(ii) Suppose the agent chose b in period 1 and the counterfactual self switches action in period
2. Then there is bγ with bγ < γ such that the agent switches course if and only if γ > bγ.
The following proposition describes the equilibria that result from these best responses. (It is
an immediate consequence of the previous lemma and thus stated without proof.)
Proposition 2 For all γ ∈
³bγ,bbγ´ there is a regret equilibrium in which the regretful agent
switches action in period 2.
The proposition implies that the regretful agent switches for a greater range of parameters than
the standard agent. To grasp the intuition for this result, notice first that the regretful agent’s
payoff risk aversion means that, like the standard agent, he has an incentive to diversify his
portfolio. However, there is an additional force at work on the regretful agent’s behaviour.
Recall from the static analysis that the regretful agent dislikes fluctuations between his actual
payoff and payoffs that would have resulted from alternative courses of action. If the weight
on the action’s payoff is the same across periods and the counterfactual strategy prescribes
switching in period 2, then if the agent switches in period 2, he obtains in period 1 what
he counterfactually would have obtained in period 1. Hence, by switching he eliminates any
fluctuations between his actual payoff and his corresponding reference point.
One interpretation of the regretful agent’s behaviour is suggested by psychological “disso-
nance” theories that view the mere act of choice as inherently painful due to the regret that is
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caused by the necessity of having to give up certain opportunities (see Festinger, 1964). The
agent in our model makes up for the opportunity missed in the first period, and thereby elim-
inates the regrets that necessarily arise from being forced to choose an action in period 1. In
this sense he appears to exhibit a “reparative” tendency as he seeks to relieve the dissonance
associated with his period 1 choice.
We close this section with an informal discussion of what happens if the weight on an action’s
payoff is different across periods (λ 6= 1). In this case, the agent’s opportunities to obtain this
type of insurance against regret are limited. On the one hand, if λ is small, then the second
period action cannot contribute much to reduce the fluctuations between overall actual and
counterfactual payoffs. As in the previous section, the period 2 incentive is then determined by
the agent’s feedback concerns and there is a regret equilibrium in which the agent sticks to his
first period action.
On the other hand, if λ is large, the main fluctuations in overall relative performance come
from period 2 payoffs. Thus, the highest correlation between actual and counterfactual payoff
can be achieved by matching one’s counterfactual period 2 action. Thus, while a standard agent
optimally chooses the second period action whose associated lottery is less risky, a regretful
agent may optimally choose an action whose associated lottery is stochastically dominated if
he believes that his counterfactual self also chooses this action. It follows from that when λ is
large, asymmetric equilibria can arise in which the agent chooses the same action in period 2
irrespective of this first period action. This matching incentive is at the core of the results of
the next section, to which we now turn.
5.2 Correlation across counterfactuals
In this section, we consider a scenario in which the payoffs from first and second period actions
are independent and the payoffs from second period actions are correlated across all possible
decision nodes. We first derive a result that identifies a tendency of the regretful agent to match
the actions that he believes his counterfactual self would choose in period 2. As an application
of this general tendency we then consider a career choice example and show that the same
agent might make very different equilibrium effort choices in period 2, depending on whether
he holds optimistic or pessimistic beliefs about his counterfactual behaviour.
The setup is as follows. In period 1, the agent’s choice set is Y1 = {a, b} with associated
lottereis Xa and Xb. In period 2, his choice set is Y
y1
2 = {c, d}.39 We denote the lottery
associated with a period 2 choice y2 by Xy1y2 , where the superscript y1 indicates that the lottery
depends on which action y1 was chosen in period 1. We assume that Xay2 and X
b
y2
have the
39Strictly speaking, c and d depend on y1. We suppress this dependency for notational simplicity.
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same distribution and are stochastically independent of Xa and Xb. The key point is that Xay2
and Xby2 might be correlated. To capture this, let Xy2 and
bXy2 be i.i.d. and let α ∈ [0, 1]. Then
we set
Xay2 = Xy2 , X
b
y2
= α ◦Xy2 ⊕ (1− α) ◦ bXy2 .
That is, if α = 1, the payoffs from actions are perfectly correlated across decision nodes, and
if α = 0, they are stochastically independent. The agent’s overall material payoff from path
(y1, y2) is given by X(y1,y2) = Xy1 +X
y1
y2
. Finally, we assume for simplicity that the agent does
not receive interim information and that the outcome of unchosen lotteries is always revealed
to the agent.40
5.2.1 Matching the counterfactual self
We now describe the agent’s period 2 incentives. To isolate the effects that arise as result of
the correlation in period 2, we focus on the case, in which the first stage is inconsequential
in terms of material payoff. That is, we assume that Xa and Xb are deterministic and equal
to zero. Notice that this does not mean that the first decision is inconsequential in terms of
regret. Rather, it is precisely the distinctive feature of our approach that the regrets about the
first decision also include the regrets about the second period action opportunities that arise
as a consequence of this first decision.
We analyse the interplay between the relative riskiness of the two options c and d and
the degree of correlation across decision nodes. To do so, we assume that Xd second order
stochastically dominates Xc and vary the correlation parameter α.
Notice that the standard agent chooses d at the second stage for all α. However, for the
regretful agent this does not need to be true. Our first result says that if lotteries are suffi-
ciently correlated across decision nodes, the agent has an incentive to match his counterfactual
behaviour.
Lemma 8 Consider the agent’s actual period 2 decision and suppose his counterfactual self
chooses action y2 in period 2. Then there is a bθ1 > 0 such that for all θ1 ≥ bθ1, there is anbα ∈ [0, 1] such that for all α ≥ bα, it is a best response to choose y2, too.
To illustrate the intuition for this result, consider the case, in which the counterfactual self
chooses the riskier option c. The actual self then faces a trade-off between risk-minimisation
and regret-minimisation. In terms of risk, option d is superior to option c by assumption. In
terms of regret, option c is superior to option d. This is once more due to the agent’s desire
to minimise the fluctuations in his overall relative performance. Because payoffs are correlated
40In this section, the nature of the feedback the agent receives is unsubstantial.
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across decision nodes, he can reduce these fluctuations by chooseing c, that is, by aligning his
second period actions across decision nodes. When the counterfactual self chooses d, then the
same two forces both favour option d for the actual self.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of the agent’s best response (and thus stated without
proof).
Proposition 3 Let θ1 and α be sufficiently large. Then there are two period 2 regret equilibria,
one in which the agent always chooses c in period 2, and one in which he always chooses d in
period 2 irrespective of his period 1 choices.41
Thus, the agent has an incentive to act in a way that he would have behaved under different
circumstances. We explore implications of this point further in the following career example.
5.2.2 Application: belief determined motivation
Suppose that in period 1, the agent chooses between two occupations, a and b, where, for
concreteness, a corresponds to “consultancy” and b corresponds to “the law”. In the second
stage, the agent chooses an effort level e ∈ {0, 1} at cost ke, k > 0, that influences the likelihood
of his career success. The key point is that we think of success to be determined by some general
unknown ability of the agent that is the same in both occupations. That is, we suppose that
the likelihood of success is correlated across occupations. Formally, the agent’s ability is given
by a state ω ∈ {0, 1} where each state’s prior probability is 1/2. In state ω, the agent’s material
payoff (gross of effort costs) is ωe in both occupations. For simplicity, we assume that the agent
learns his true ability after his effort choice.
The matching incentive gives rise to a complementarity between the agent’s conjecture about
his counterfactual effort choice and his own effort choice. To see this formally, define ∆e as the
agent’s period 2 incentive to choose high effort (the difference between the utility he obtains
from working hard and the utility he obtains from shirking) given that his counterfactual self
chooses effort e. Then we have:
Proposition 4 The agent’s incentive to choose high effort is higher the higher the counterfac-
tual self ’s effort, i.e. ∆1 ≥ ∆0.
The result is a straightforward consequence of the matching incentive. It shows that the agent’s
motivation depends on what he conjectures he would have done in his counterfactual occupation.
If as a consultant the agent believes that he would have worked hard as a lawyer, he better
work hard as a consultant so as not to regret not having become a successful lawyer. In other
41It is easy to see that, generically, these two equilibria are the only pure-strategy equilibria.
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words, the agent’s motivation is determined by his general views about himself: his self-image.
An agent who is generally optimistic about himself with respect to other possible worlds, will
tend to be more motivated than a more pessimistic but otherwise identical agent.42
The idea that motivation is driven by self-perceptions is familiar to psychologists. In their
influential review of the evidence, Taylor and Brown (1988) conclude that “self-enhancing per-
ceptions ... appear to foster motivation, persistence at tasks, and ultimately, more effective
performance.” (p. 199) and argue that differences in self-images across individuals can be ex-
plained as the result of a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy: someone who is optimistic (pessimistic)
about his talents will tend to be more (less) motivated, resulting in better (worse) outcomes.
Better (worse) outcomes, in turn, will confirm his optimistic (pessimistic) expectations. For an
elaboration of this view, see Aspinwall et al. (2001).
Our approach shares with these accounts the theme of self-fulfilling expectations. However,
in our model, it is not expectations about actual future outcomes but about counterfactual
comparisons that determine current incentives. We are not aware of psychological studies that
have pointed to the motivating force of this type of counterfactual reasoning.43
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an extension of regret theory, which can be used to analyse
dynamic decision problems. The key idea is to conceive of a dynamic decision making problem
with regret as an intra-personal game in which the agent forms rational conjectures about the
behaviour of the various counterfactual selves that he could have been.
Our approach raises a series of issues that go beyond the analysis that we have undertaken
in this paper. For example, it is easy to see that in a static setup, a regretful agent might be
better off with a smaller choice set because it reduces the number of alternatives that he has to
forgo. In our dynamic setup we can ask whether the agent would actually choose to pre-commit
to less choice given that, after the fact, he might regret his first period commitment.
42Of course, in equilibrium, effort choice and self-image have to be consistent. It is straightforward to see that
multiple equilibria might arise in our setup, one in which the agent works hard in both occupations and one in
which he chooses zero effort in both occupations. Thus, even though the agent must form his beliefs about his
counterfactual selves in a rational way in our setup, it is compatible with different, self-sustaining self-images
and behaviours.
43Markus and Nurius (1986) introduce the notion of possible selves and argue that the desire or fear to
become a specific future self provides incentives for current action. While they do emphasise the importance of
counterfactual comparisons for construing the current self-image (p. 963), they maintain that the attractiveness
of a future self is determined by its actual features only but not by the counterfactual comparisons it will engage
in.
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At a more conceptual level, our theory highlights the need to investigate further the close
interaction between regret and counterfactual reasoning. In classic regret theory, the agent
engages in comparisons between what he actually did and what he possibly could have done
counterfactually. We have argued, however, that once we move into the realm of dynamic
decision problems, the agent’s reference point is inevitably determined by his conjectures about
what he reasonably would have done at a second stage had he made a different first period
choice.
Psychological research suggests that such considerations might play a role not only in dy-
namic but also in static decision problems. Indeed, Kahneman and Miller (1986) argue that
counterfactual comparisons depend in important ways on people’s ability to mentally “undo”
an antecedent event that led to the actual outcome. For example, regrets arising from poor
outcomes are typically larger if a modification of the antecedent event is easier to imagine. In
this spirit it seems reasonable to assume that people’s regrets about their own choices should
depend on how easy it is for them to perceive that they would have acted differently in the
past. Regrets might then arise as a result of the discrepancy between the agent’s actual choice
and of what he thinks he would have chosen could he choose again on the basis of his ex-post
knowledge. We plan to explore these conceptual issues in a companion paper.
Finally, evidence suggests that, in reality, the experience of regret interacts in important
ways with the experience of disappointment that is generated by the discovery that reality has
fallen short of expectations (Roese, 1997). Combining our model with the previously mentioned
models of personal equilibrium is likely to be a fruitful way to understand this interaction in
more detail.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose that Xy second order stochastically dominates Xy0. We need to
show that the agent’s preference for y over y0, defined as ∆Uy = U(y,∆LT ) − U (y0,∆LT ), is
non-negative. ∆Uy can be written as
E [φ (Xy)− φ (Xy0)] + θE [ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry)− ρ (φ (Xy0)−Ry0)] , (1)
where, since ∆LT = ∅, Ry = maxby∈Y \y E [φ (Xby) |Xy] and Ry0 = maxby∈Y \y0 E [φ (Xby) |Xy0 ].
Now observe first that since φ is weakly concave, and Xy second order stochastically dominates
Xy0, the first term of (1) is non-negative. It remains to show that the second term is also non-
negative. To see this, notice that because (Xy)y∈Y are stochastically independent, the reference
points Ry and Ry0 are in fact constants, and because E [φ (Xy0)] = E [φ (Xy)], it follows that
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Ry = Ry0. Hence, we are done if we can show that
θE [ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry)− ρ (φ (Xy0)−Ry)] (2)
is non-negative .Define an auxiliary function, g (x) = ρ (φ (x)−Ry). Since ρ and φ are concave,
g is also concave. Since Xy second order stochastically dominates Xy0, it follows that (2) is
non-negative which is what we sought to prove. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3 Consider information sets IT = I(∆LT ) and I 0T = I(∆L
0
T ) where ∆LT is
contained in ∆L0T . Let Ry and R
0
y be the agent’s reference point given final information sets
IT and I 0T respectively. We need to show that the preference for information set IT over I
0
T ,
defined as ∆UI = U(y,∆LT )− U(y, Y,∆L0T ), is non-negative. ∆UI is given by
∆UI = θ
¡
E[ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry)]−E
£
ρ
¡
φ (Xy)−R0y
¢¤¢
.
The law of iterated expectations applied on this expression yields that it suffices to show that
E
£
ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry)− ρ
¡
φ (Xy)−R0y
¢¯¯
IT
¤
≥ 0. (3)
To see that (3) holds, notice that since Xy and Ry are fully determined by IT , it follows that
E [ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry)| IT ] = ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry) .
Moreover, since ρ is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies that
E
£
ρ
¡
φ (Xy)−R0y
¢¯¯
IT
¤
≤ ρ
¡
E [φ (Xy)| IT ]− E
£
R0y
¯¯
IT
¤¢
. (4)
Hence, (3) follows if we can show that the right hand side of (4) is smaller than ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry).
To see this, recall first that R0y = max
y0∈Y \y
E [φ (Xy0)| I 0T ]. Hence, since max
y0∈Y \y
{φ (Xy0)} is a convex
function in the vector {φ (Xy0)}y0∈Y \y, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that E
£
R0y
¯¯
IT
¤
≥
max
y0∈Y \y
E [E [φ (Xy0)| I 0T ] |IT ] = Ry. Furthermore, E [φ (Xy)| IT ] equals φ (Xy) and ρ is increas-
ing. Thus, the right hand side of (4) is smaller than ρ (φ (Xy)−Ry), which is what we wanted
to show. ¤ 44
Proof of Example 1 We have to show that the agent’s incentive to choose a, defined as
U (a)− U (b), is non-negative. Since E[Xa] = E[Xb] and φ (x) = x, this incentive is given by
θE [ρ(Xa −E[Xb|Xa])]− θE [ρ(Xb −Xa)] .
44This proof is the only point where we make use of the maximimum specification of the reference point. If
the reference point were given by a linear combination of the expected payoffs of the unchosen alternative, the
result would still hold. In this case, the law of iterated expectations implies that E
£
R0y|IT
¤
= Ry.
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To see that this is non-negative, notice first that sinceXa andXb are symmetrically distributed,
the second term in this expression equals θE [ρ(Xa −Xb)]. Moreover, Jensen’s inequality for
conditional expectations implies that
ρ(Xa − E[Xb|Xa]) ≥ E [ρ (Xa −Xb) |Xa] .
Hence, the first term is not larger than θE [ρ(Xa −Xb)]. These two observations imply the
claim. ¤
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose first that the agent does not receive feedback on Xβ. Then,
his reference point is E [φ (Xβ ) |Xa] = βφ (Xa) + (1− β)E
h
φ
³ bXa´i. Thus, his utility from
choosing a is given by
u (a) = E [φ (Xa)] +E
h
ρ
³
(1− β)
³
φ (Xa)−E
h
φ
³ bXa´i´´i .
Now notice that since E [Xa] = E
h bXai, the mean of the lottery (1− β)³φ (Xa)−E hφ³ bXa´i´
does not change in β, but its risk falls in β. Thus, the concavity of ρ implies that u increases
in β.
Suppose next that the agent receives feedback on Xβ . Then with probability β, the agent’s
reference point is φ (Xa) and with probability 1 − β, his reference point is φ
³ bXa´. Thus, his
utility from choosing a is
u (a) = E [φ (Xa)] + (1− β)E
h
ρ
³
φ (Xa)− φ
³ bXa´´i .
By Jensen’s inequality and because Xa and bXa are identically distributed:
E
h
ρ
³
φ (Xa)− φ
³ bXa´´i ≤ 0. Hence, u increases in β. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5 To prove the claim, we consider the case only in which the agent chose
a in period 1. (Identical considerations apply to the case in which he chose b.) Under this
assumption, we compare the utilities from choosing a and b in the second period. Suppose the
agent has observed realisation (Za, Zb) = (−1,+1). Then his expected utility from choosing a
is given by
E [u (a, a)] = E [φ (Xa + λXa) |Xa < 0,Xb > 0] ,
and his expected utility from choosing b is
E [u (a, b)] = E [φ (Xa + λXb) |Xa < 0,Xb > 0] .
We want to show that the agent’s incentive to choose b is positive. But notice that on the event
{Xa < 0,Xb > 0}, the value of Xa + λXb is strictly larger than that of Xa + λXa. Therefore,
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since φ is increasing E [u (a, b)] is clearly larger than E [u (a, a)]. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1 We shall look for conditions such that in period 2, the agent sticks
to his first period action for all types of news, that is, sa (za, zb) = a for all za, zb ∈ {−1,+1} is
a best response against sb (za, zb) = b for all za, zb ∈ {−1,+1}, and thus (sa, sb) is a period 2
regret-equilibrium. Suppose that a was chosen in period 1 and suppose that sb (za, zb) = b for
all za, zb ∈ {−1,+1}. (The case in which b was chosen in period 1 is symmetric.)
If the agent chooses a in the second period, then because Xa and Xb are independent, he
learns nothing more about Xb after making his second period decision. Given his conjecture
about his counterfactual behaviour, the reference point R1 against which he evaluates his first
decision is the expected payoff from the path (b, b) conditional on the realisation Z. Hence,
R1 = E [φ ((1 + λ)Xb) |Z]. Using these reference points and the payoff risk associated with a,
the expected utility from choosing a in period 2 is given by
E [u(a, a)] = E [φ ((1 + λ)Xa) |Z] + θ1E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)−E [φ ((1 + λ)Xb) |Z]) |Z] .
If the agent chooses b in the second period, he will eventually learn both Xa and Xb. Therefore,
his reference point is R1 = φ ((1 + λ)Xb), and his expected utility from choosing b is given by
E [u(a, b)] = E [φ (Xa + λXb) |Z] + θ1E [ρ (φ (Xa + λXb)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb)) |Z] .
Thus, the agent’s incentive to choose a, E [u(a, a)] − E [u(a, b)], can be written as the sum
ξ0 + ξ1, where the first part is the difference in the material payoff:
ξ0 = E [φ ((1 + λ)Xa) |Z]−E [φ (Xa + λXb) |Z] ,
and the second part is the difference in regret with respect to the first decision:
ξ1 = θ1 (E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− E [φ ((1 + λ)Xb) |Z]) |Z]
−E [ρ (φ (Xa + λXb)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb)) |Z])
We want to show that for any realisation of Z, the sum over the ξ’s is positive if λ is small and
θ1 is large. To do so, notice that ξ0 is bounded from below. (This is, because the support of
Xa and Xb is compact and φ is continous, thus bounded on the support of Xa and Xb.) Hence,
it suffices to show that for any realisation of Z, ξ1 is strictly positive for small λ. We can then
choose θ1 large enough such that ξ1 outweighs the possibly negative impact of ξ0.
To see that ξ1 is strictly positive for small λ, we first subtract and add
E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− φ ((1 + λ) (Xb))) |Z] to ξ1/θ1 to obtain
ξ1/θ1 = E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− E [φ ((1 + λ)Xb) |Z])− ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− φ ((1 + λ) (Xb))) |Z]
+E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− φ ((1 + λ) (Xb)))− ρ (φ (Xa + λXb)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb)) |Z] .
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Define the difference in the first line of the right hand side as δ (λ). Jensen’s inequality yields
that δ (λ) > 0. The inequality holds strict, because ρ is strictly concave and the conditional
distribution of Xa conditional on Z is non-degenerate. Define δmin = minλ∈[0,1] δ (λ). Since the
minimum is taken over a compact set, we have that δmin is strictly positive. We thus obtain:
ξ1/θ1 > δmin +E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb))− ρ (φ (Xa + λXb)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb)) |Z] .
To conclude the proof, it therefore remains to show that the second term in this expression is
not smaller than −δmin for small λ. To see this, define the arguments in ρ respectively as
∆φ1 (λ, xa, xb) = φ ((1 + λ)xa)− φ ((1 + λ)xb) ,
∆φ2 (λ, xa, xb) = φ (xa + λxb)− φ ((1 + λ)xb) .
Notice first that ∆φ1 (λ, xa, xb)−∆φ2 (λ, xa, xb) → 0 for λ → 0. Moreover, because the support
of Xa and Xb is compact, ∆
φ
1 (λ, xa, xb) −∆φ2 (λ, xa, xb) is uniformly continuous for all λ ≤ 1.
It follows from these two observations that for all τ > 0 there is a λτ > 0 such that for all
realisations xa, xb: ¯¯¯
∆φ1 (λ, xa, xb)−∆φ2 (λ, xa, xb)
¯¯¯
< τ for all λ ≤ λτ .
In addition, ρ is uniformly continuous on the compact support of Xa and Xb. Hence, there is
a τ > 0 such that for all realisations of ∆φ1 and ∆
φ
2 with
¯¯¯
∆φ1 −∆φ2
¯¯¯
< τ : ρ
³
∆φ1
´
− ρ
³
∆φ2
´
>
−δmin/2. This implies that if we now choose λ ≤ λτ , then
E [ρ (φ ((1 + λ)Xa)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb))− ρ (φ (Xa + λXb)− φ ((1 + λ)Xb)) |Z] > −δmin/2,
which is what we sought to prove. ¤
Proof of Lemma 6 Suppose first that γ ≥ 1. Notice first that the choice (y1, y2) = (b, b)
is dominated by the choice (a, a). This is so, because (b, b) is associated with the lottery
2Xb = 2γ bXa, and the choice (a, a) is associated with the lottery 2Xa. But since Xa and bXa are
i.i.d., 2Xa second order stochastically dominates 2γ bXa for γ ≥ 1.
Moreover, the incentive to choose (a, b) or (b, a) rather then (a, a) is given by
ξ0 (γ) = E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i−E [φ (2Xa)] . (5)
We shall now show that (a) ξ0 (γ) is declining in γ with limγ→∞ ξ0 (γ) = −∞, and (b) ξ0 (1) > 0.
This then implies that there is a γ > 1 such that the agent chooses (a, b) if and only if γ < γ,
which is the claim that we need to show.
We begin with (b). This follows from the fact that Xa + bXa second order stochastically
dominates 2Xa and because φ is strictly concave.
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As for (a), we use the symmetry of Xa and bXa to write
E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i = Z ∞
0
Z ∞
0
[φ (− (xa + γbxa)) + φ (xa + γbxa)]
+ [φ (− (xa − γbxa)) + φ (xa − γbxa)] dFa (xa) dFa (bxa) .
The strict concavity of φ implies that for all xa, bxa the terms in the squared brackets are nega-
tive and converge monotonically to −∞ as γ →∞. Thus, the Monotone Convergence Theorem
implies that the integral converges monotonically to −∞ as γ →∞. This establishes the claim
for γ ≥ 1. The case γ < 1 follows with identical arguments. ¤
Proof of Lemma 7 To establish part (i), suppose that sb = a, and that the agent has
chosen a in period 1. Then, if he chooses a in period 2, he does not learn Xb and his reference
point is R1 = E [φ (Xb +Xa)]. Hence, with Xb = γ bXa, the expected utility from choosing a in
period 2 is
u (a) = E [φ (2Xa)] + θ1E
h
ρ
³
φ (2Xa)−E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i´i .
If he chooses b in period 2, he learns Xb and his reference point is R1 = φ (Xb +Xa). Note that
his reference point is equal to his actual overall payoff. Thus, the agent will have no regrets
and his expected utility is
u (b) = E [φ (2Xa)] .
Let
ξ1 (γ) = E
h
ρ
³
φ (2Xa)−E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i´i ,
then the incentive to switch to b in period 2 is given by
∆b (γ) = u (b)− u (a) = ξ0 (γ)− θ1ξ1 (γ) ,
where ξ0 (γ) is defined by (5). We now show that (a)∆b (γ) is declining in γ with limγ→∞∆b (γ) =
−∞, and (b) ∆b (0) > 0, and (c) ∆b
¡
γ
¢
> 0, where γ is the cutoff at which the standard agent
is indifferent between (a, b) and (a, a). This then implies that there is a bbγ > γ such that the
regretful agent switches to b if and only if γ < γ, which is the claim that we want to show.
We begin with (b) and (c) and the observation that Jensen’s inequality implies that
ξ1 (γ) < ρ
³
E [φ (2Xa)]−E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i´ = ρ (−ξ0 (γ)) ,
where the inequality is strict, since ρ is strictly convave. Thus, ∆b (γ) > ξ0 (γ)− θ1ρ (−ξ0 (γ)).
As for (b), notice now that ξ0 (0) > 0 since Xa second order stochastically dominates 2Xa and
because φ is strictly concave. Hence, all terms on the right hand side of the previous inequality
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are strictly positive and so ∆b (0) > 0, establishing (b). As for (c), note that by definition,
ξ0
¡
γ
¢
= 0. Hence, ∆b
¡
γ
¢
> 0.
As for (a), we have already established in the proof of Lemma 6 that limγ→∞ ξ0 (γ) = −∞.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that limγ→∞ ξ1 (γ) = −∞. To see this notice that we have shown
in part (a) of the proof of Lemma 6 that E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i converges monotonically to −∞ as
γ →∞. Thus, since ρ is increasing, ρ
³
φ (2xa)−E
h
φ
³
Xa + γ bXa´i´ converges monotonically
to −∞ for all xa as γ →∞. Thus the integral over this expression converges monotonically to
−∞ by the Monotone Convergence Theorem. This establishes part (i).
Part (ii), which deals with the case, in which sa = b, and the agent has chosen b in period
1, follows with identical arguments. ¤
Proof of Lemma 8 Let sy1 ∈ Y2 be the agent’s period 2 strategy after having chosen ac-
tion y1 in period 1. To show the claim, we have to show that for α ≥ bα, sa = y2 is a best
response against sb = y2 and vice versa. We only show that sa = c is a best response against
sb = c. All the other cases follow with identical arguments.
So let sb = c and suppose the agent has chosen a in period 1. Then, the counterfactual
self obtains φ (Xc) with probability α and φ
³ bXc´ with probability 1 − α. Thus, the agent’s
reference point is φ (Xc) with probability α and φ
³ bXc´ with probability 1 − α. Hence, his
expected utility from choosing c is
u (c) = E [φ (Xc)] + θ1E
h
αρ (φ (Xc)− φ (Xc)) + (1− α) ρ
³
φ (Xc)− φ
³ bXc´´i
= E [φ (Xc)] + θ1 (1− α)E
h
ρ
³
φ (Xc)− φ
³ bXc´´i .
Likewise, his expected utility from choosing d is
u (d) = E [φ (Xd)] + θ1E
h
αρ (φ (Xd)− φ (Xc)) + (1− α) ρ
³
φ (Xd)− φ
³ bXc´´i
= E [φ (Xd)] + θ1E [ρ (φ (Xd)− φ (Xc))] ,
where the second equality holds because Xc and bXc are identically distributed.
We want to show that u (c) is larger than u (d) for sufficiently large θ1 and α. To see that
is true, notice first that the E [φ (Xd)] ≥ E [φ (Xc)], because Xd second order stochastically
dominates Xc by assumption. Thus, we need to show that the regret from c is smaller than
that from d for sufficiently large α, that is
(1− α)E
h
ρ
³
φ (Xc)− φ
³ bXc´´i > E [ρ (φ (Xd)− φ (Xc))] (6)
for sufficiently large α. (We can then choose θ1 sufficiently large to override material incen-
tives.) To (6), notice first that ρ (E [φ (Xd)− φ (Xc)]) is a strict upper bound for the right
36
hand side of (6) by Jensen’s inequality and because ρ is strictly concave. Moreover, because
Xd second order stochastically dominates Xc, this upper bound is negative, and hence the
right hand side of (6) is strictly negative. Observe now that the left hand side (6) converges
to 0 as α converges to 1. Thus, (6) holds for sufficiently large α, and this completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose first the counterfactual self chooses e = 0. This gives
rise to the reference point R1 = φ (0). Thus, the agent’s expected utility from choosing e = 0
and e = 1, respectively, is
u (0, 0) = φ (0) + θ1ρ (0) = φ (0) ,
u (1, 0) = φ
µ
1
2
− k
¶
+ θ1
µ
1
2
ρ (φ (1− k)− φ (0)) + 1
2
ρ (φ (−k)− φ (0))
¶
.
Hence,
∆0 = u (1, 0)−u (0, 0) = φ
µ
1
2
− k
¶
−φ (0)+θ1
µ
1
2
ρ (φ (1− k)− φ (0)) + 1
2
ρ (φ (−k)− φ (0))
¶
.
Suppose next the counterfactual self chooses e = 1. If the agent chooses e = 0, then his
reference point depends on the true state that is revealed to the agent. If he learns that ω = 1,
his reference point is R1 = φ (1− k), while if he learns that ω = 0, his reference point is
R1 = φ (−k). Hence, his expected utility is
u (0, 1) = φ (0) + θ1
µ
1
2
ρ (φ (0)− φ (1− k)) + 1
2
ρ (φ (0)− φ (−k))
¶
.
If the agent chooses e = 1, then he matches exactly his counterfactual self’s payoff and thus
receives expected utility
u (1, 1) = φ
µ
1
2
− k
¶
+ θ1ρ (0) = φ
µ
1
2
− k
¶
Hence,
∆1 = u (1, 1)−u (0, 1) = φ
µ
1
2
− k
¶
−φ (0)−θ1
µ
1
2
ρ (φ (0)− φ (1− k)) + 1
2
ρ (φ (0)− φ (−k))
¶
.
We want to show that ∆1−∆0 ≥ 0. From the above expressions, this difference can be written
as
∆1 −∆0 = −
1
2
θ1 {[ρ (φ (0)− φ (1− k)) + ρ (φ (1− k)− φ (0))] +
+ [ρ (φ (0)− φ (−k)) + ρ (φ (−k)− φ (0))] .
But because ρ is concave, the terms in the square brackets are non-positive, and this implies
the claim. ¤
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